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
THE ARMY RESERVE AND U.S.
NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL(P) DAVID S. RITTERPUSCH, MI

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The study examines the increased requirements placed on the Army Reserve by the national defense strategy and evaluates the Army Reserve's operational capability to support that strategy. It bases the evaluation on an examination of six factors in the Army Reserve's external environment and six features of the Army Reserve's internal workings. By reviewing the positive and negative aspects of the Army Reserve's capabilities, the study arrives at four major operational areas in which the Army Reserve is underdeveloped. The study finds that although the Army has made progress in closing the Reserve operational gaps, the systems needed to support the much enlarged Army Reserve have not been sufficiently developed and the Army is neither resourced nor organized to provide the necessary systems. The study concludes that the U.S. national leaders should either change the national defense strategy or, alternatively, improve the Army Reserve's operational capabilities. Such improvements require not only a commitment by the Army but also, critically, a decision by OSD to support the Reserve portion of the national defense strategy. The systemic changes required involve a mix of four operational modes: (1) Converting Active Army systems to the Reserve-Active mode; (2) Modifying so-called Total Army systems to better support the Army Reserve; (3) Expanding existing Army Reserve systems; and (4) Creating new systems. The study closes by recommending that the Secretary of Defense (or Deputy Secretary), the Secretary of the Army, the Army Chief of Staff, and the Chief, Army Reserve determine the Defense Department's vision for the Army Reserve--in the context of the national strategy, and set into motion a broad plan of action to correct the current situation.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

THE ARMY RESERVE AND U.S. NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study will examine the requirements placed on the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) by the national defense strategy, as currently embodied in the 1988 National Security Strategy, and will evaluate the Army Reserve's operational capability to meet those requirements. The study's underlying objective is to determine what significant gaps exist between the national strategy and the Army Reserve's capabilities, and to analyze how to close those gaps.

The largest chapters of the study, Chapters II and III, are devoted to evaluating key features of the Army Reserve's external and internal environment, respectively. Each of these chapters looks at six factors, three of which are positive and three that are negative.

The next chapter, Chapter IV, identifies critical operational questions that confront the Army Reserve and organizes them into four areas: Resourcing, Training, Equipping, and Leading/Managing. In turn, Chapter V matches Army Reserve capabilities against the national defense strategy. It draws the conclusion that the operational systems needed for the Army Reserve are significantly underdeveloped and that, as a result, the Army is not able to fulfill its portion of the current national defense strategy.

The following chapter, Chapter VI, spells out the choices that face national leadership regarding the Army Reserve. It identifies the four operational modes available if the decision is made to support the current national strategy. It stresses, however, that such a choice will require a commitment by OSD (the Office of the Secretary of Defense) to underwrite the necessary operational improvements. Within DOD, OSD is the banker for the military departments and is ultimately responsible for assuring that Reserve operational capabilities meet the national defense strategy's requirements.

The study ends with Chapter VII, which provides a summary of the study and recommends a course of action for the nation's leaders.

STRATEGIC TRENDS

Before moving to the external environmental scan in Chapter II, it is important to look at recent U.S. strategic trends that have impacted on the Reserve Components in general and the Army Reserve in particular.

The Large and Growing Portion of Army Requirements Vested in the Reserve Components

First, as illustrated by Figure 1, a larger portion of the Army's force structure is in the Reserve Components than in the Active Army. This structural reliance on Reserve units has become steadily more pronounced throughout the 1980's. For example, in FY81 the Reserve Components' force structure exceeded the Active Army's by 9,300 spaces, a 1.4 percent difference. Then, in every succeeding year, the Reserve Components' force structure was increased while the Active Army's was held essentially constant (in size). The net effect is that Reserve Component units now account for 78,400 more force structure spaces than does the Active Army, a 12 percent gap. Moreover, the recent decision to reduce the Active Army end strength and force structure in FY88 (because of budgetary constraints) means that the Reserve Components' share of the Army's force structure will become proportionately even greater than it has been.[1]

The Increased Criticality of Reserve Functions

Secondly, the Army has elected to place much of its support in the Reserve Components. This decision means that many Army combat units have become dependent on Reserve Component units for support from the outset of hostilities. In other words, in many cases, Army warfighting capabilities can be sustained only with the quick insertion of Reserve support. This force alignment was adopted to enable the Active Army to

FORCE STRUCTURE

Force Structure

	81	82	83	84	85	86	87
RC	683.6	689.4	701.2	712.1	720.4	732.0	756.9
AC	674.3	676.0	674.7	681.4	677.7	676.7	678.5
Δ	9.3	13.4	26.5	30.7	42.7	55.3	78.4
Δ/AC	1.4%	2.0%	3.9%	4.5%	6.3%	8.2%	11.6%

FIGURE 1

FORCE STRUCTURE

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increase the size of its combat forces, the so-called "tooth" in the "tooth-to-tail" ratio. The changes made to accomplish this were largely at the expense of Combat Service Support capabilities, 67 percent of which now reside in the Reserve Components.[2]

OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The strategic trends toward increased reliance on the Reserve Components have the following two major operational implications:

Appropriate Management and Support Systems

First, a larger Reserve force obviously requires more supplies, more dollars, more technical and managerial personnel, and more equipment. Most importantly, however, to be effective the enlarged Reserve needs enhanced management and support systems. And whether they are dedicated to the Reserve or shared, these systems need to be fitted to Reserve operational requirements.

To grasp the growth dimensions involved, realize that the Army's Reserve Components grew by almost 150,000 personnel between FY81 and FY87, an increase of almost 25 percent, while Active Army strength remained capped. (See Figure 2.)[3] If one extends this ramp back to FY78, the post-Vietnam strength nadir, the Reserve growth through FY87 becomes almost 250,000 personnel, roughly a 50 percent build-up from the FY78 level.

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
Personnel Strength							
	_81_	_82_	_83_	_84_	_85_	_86_	_87_
AC	781.0	780.3	779.6	780.2	780.8	780.8	780.8
RC	<u>614.2</u>	<u>656.4</u>	<u>675.2</u>	<u>698.5</u>	<u>720.1</u>	<u>742.8</u>	<u>752.4</u>
Δ	166.8	133.9	104.4	81.7	60.7	38.0	28.4
Δ / RC	27.2%	20.4%	15.5%	11.7%	8.4%	5.1%	3.8%

NOTE: Reserve Personnel Strength here includes unit strength, i.e., Paid Drill Strength, and AGR strength. Were the Army Reserve IMA's (Individual Mobilization Augmentees) included, the RC figures would grow by 13,100 in FY87. In fact, when IMA's are included, the total RC Personnel Strength, known as the Selected Reserve, passes the Active Component's strength during 1988. Projected FY88 end strength with IMA's -- RC: 777,800; AC: 772,300.

FIGURE 2

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

Readiness Requirements

Secondly, because Reserve Component capabilities are now so critical to the Army's warfighting, Reserve forces must be ready for rapid insertion and immediate integration in support of embattled units. Accordingly, Reserve Component personnel must be trained in skills they can apply immediately, skills that are current and that will work in support of the Army's latest technologies. For example, if the Reservists and Guardsmen are mechanics, they must be skilled to provide maintenance on equipment currently fielded with the units they will support, whether this equipment consists of Bradley fighting vehicles, Abrams tanks, or the latest transportation vehicles.

Likewise, if Reserve Component units are to bring equipment and tools with them, it needs to be equipment that can be integrated into the battlefield and tools that are required to maintain the equipment the Army will have on the battlefield.

ENDNOTES

1. Scott Lund, "Military Manpower Tables," p. 4.

2. _Ibid._, and Diana Woody, "CSS by Compo Structural Strength." Note: The 67 percent is a reference to the Reserve Components' share of the CSS spaces that are in units of the Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and Active Army; so-called "Compo's" 3, 2, and 1, respectively.

3. Lund, pp. 1 & 4.

CHAPTER II

EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL SCAN

The analysis of the Army Reserve's ability to perform its role in the national defense strategy begins with this chapter's scan of the external environment in which the Army Reserve operates. This examination looks at three external factors that have a favorable impact on the Reserve's operational capability to support the national military strategy and at three external factors that are obstacles to its accomplishment of that mission.

POSITIVE EXTERNAL FACTORS

The three favorable factors presented are as follows: first, the national strategy's continued (and possibly increased) requirement for conventional ground forces; second, the resource-driven limitations placed on the Active Army that prevent it from providing all the conventional ground forces or support elements required of it; and, lastly, the Reserve-oriented operational improvements being experienced by certain elements of the Army's infrastructure.

Requirements for Conventional Ground Forces

To begin, the national defense strategy of "flexible response," as articulated by the President, requires strong conventional forces for deterrence and for warfighting.

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Moreover, heavy reliance is placed specifically on ground forces as evidenced by the January 1988 National Security Strategy, which states: " . . . The land based forces . . . would have primary responsibility for blunting a Warsaw Pact attack . . . Absent such capability, Alliance strategy becomes heavily dependent on the threat of resorting to nuclear weapons to achieve essential deterrence and warfighting objectives."[1]

Ironically, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty signed by President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in December 1987 may make American ground forces more critical given the "great disparity in conventional forces on the [European] continent which directly threatens Western Europe."[2]

Limitations on Active Army's Size

A second factor favoring the Army Reserve is the inability of the Active Army to provide all the forces required of it by the national defense strategy. As reflected in Chapter I, both the personnel strength and the force structure size of the Active Army have been held constant this decade and now, in 1988, are being reduced. These limitations are budgetarily driven and, in the words of the President, have placed "increased responsibilities on the reserve components."[3]

Given the continued strategic requirement for conventional ground forces cited earlier in this chapter, the limitations on active capabilities place two types of added responsibility on the Reserves. First, according to the National Security

Strategy, "reserve component units [will be deployed] side by side with, and sometimes even ahead of, the active duty forces."[4] Secondly, again quoting from the National Security Strategy, ". . . force limitations will force us to conduct sequential operations in successive theaters,"[5] therefore, sustainment will be critical, and sustainment capabili.ies for the Army are vested disproportionately in the Reserve Components, especially the Army Reserve--as we shall see in more detail later in this chapter.

Improvements in Army Infrastructure

The third external development favorable to the Army Reserve is the commitment by some elements of the Army's operational structure to make the Reserve operationally capable of supporting the defense strategy. These offices and agencies have dedicated selected sub-elements and considerable energy to defining and meeting Reserve operational requirements. They give a ray of hope for the future.

One recent example is provided by the leadership of the Army training community. At Headquarters, Department of the Army, for instance, the Army's Training Directorate has formed a Reserve cell reporting directly to the general officer charged with DA training oversight. He and they are not simply overlaying existing Active Army programs on the Reserve. Rather, together they are trying to focus on the underlying challenges in the Reserve training environment. Their intention

is to identify the true nature of the Reserve problems and design and encourage solutions that will fit Reserve needs.

Similarly, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has initiated a major task force effort that brings together many different Army leaders and managers in an attempt to involve that command and the Army more effectively in managing the Reserve aspects of its training charter.[6]

These infrastructure improvements, though somewhat isolated, do offer encouragement. However, even they must stand the test of time. For example, will the respective agencies have the ability to sustain these initiatives over time? Will they be able to provide the energy, attention, resources, personnel, and the sustained support of senior leadership necessary to institutionalize these Reserve-oriented undertakings? Or will these programs quickly atrophy as new senior personnel having other agendas replace current leaders?

EXTERNAL OBSTACLES

The three major obstacles presented below are as follows: first, having a disproportionately large share of the Army's Combat Service Support missions, which problem is compounded by the defacto low priority for support to such missions, strategic premises notwithstanding; second, the failure of external systems to meet Army Reserve needs; and, lastly, resourcing difficulties that have handicapped the Army Reserve even through the expansive Reagan years.

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Unfavorable Effect of Large CSS Mission

The first major hindrance for the Army Reserve is the effect of having a disproportionately large share of the Army's Combat Service Support (CSS) mission. Specifically, 48 percent of Army Reserve force structure spaces are CSS (140,300 out of 294,900). This contrasts sharply with the Active Army, for which only 16 percent of spaces are CSS (107,700 out of 678,50u), and with the Army National Guard, for which only 17 percent are CSS (77,200 out of 461,600). The overall effect is that 43 percent of all CSS is provided by the Army Reserve, 33 percent by the Active Army, and 24 percent by the Army National Guard.[7]

The unfavorable impact of being saddled with so much of the Army's CSS is pronounced. Resourcing decisions, consciously and unconsciously, do not favor Combat Service Support. Research and development initiatives tend not to be in Combat Service Support. Even simulators and training devices are invariably developed first for combat arms and last, if at all, for Combat Service Support. Moreover, Army senior leadership is never chosen from the combat service support branches and rarely has had CSS experience.[8] Even the President has characterized CSS (i.e., "adequate, sustained support") as "this unglamorous but essential component of military power."[9]

External Management and Support Systems Are Not Designed To Meet Reserve Requirements

The second obstacle comes from the Army's management and support systems, which by and large are not tailored to meet Reserve requirements. At the Department of the Army level, for example, the Army Chief of Staff's three key deputies--the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS), the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG)--have about 900 military officers working for them. These 900 officers are organized to provide the planning, resourcing, and policy work needed by the Army on a day-in, day-out basis. There are literally hundreds of defined managerial functions required of them, and most of these functions are just as pertinent to managing the 300,000 man Army Reserve and the 450,000 man Army National Guard as they are to managing the 780,000 man Active Army. Yet the overwhelming majority of functions performed by the DCSOPS, the DCSPER, and the DCSLOG are oriented on the Active Army. Relatively few Reserve problems, plans, or programs are worked to any depth.

There are, however, some distinguished exceptions. For example, very often the Assistant DCSOPS (ADCSOPS) and the Assistant DCSPER (ADCSPER) are deeply involved in Reserve matters, and certain of their action officers work Reserve matters intensively. However, all too often the results of these efforts do not become institutionalized--so Army leaders

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and managers tend to find themselves back at "square one" on Reserve matters year after year.

The failure to tailor systems to Reserve requirements is just as prevalent in the field as it is in the Pentagon. For example, the Army Training Board reported in May 1987 that,

> the Army's training management system . . . is oriented strongly toward the realities of the AC training environment . . . and does not adequately address divergent methods more amenable to the RC training environment.[10]

Similarly, in regard to the development of training devices, the Board noted,

> The process through which acquisition of devices takes place is meant to fully account for both AC and RC needs, but it does not appear to effectively accomplish this goal. Evidence of this observation lies not only in the paucity of training devices found in the RC units, but also in the lack of evidence reflecting analysis of unique RC requirements. . . .[11]

On balance, whether commissioned from ROTC, OCS, or West Point, the Army's leaders are trained almost exclusively to perform functions required by the active component. Very little attention is paid to educating them about the Reserve environment or Reserve-unique problems.

In many respects, this arrangement is not a serious problem for the Army National Guard, which is a relatively autonomous, self-sufficient institution. The Army Reserve, on the other hand, is highly dependent on the active component. As a consequence, it suffers critically when Army systems are organized narrowly to support Active Army requirements. In such cases, the Army Reserve finds its requirements neglected

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or addressed inadequately by systems which have not been tailored to its needs.

Resourcing Difficulties

Resourcing is the third area of external constraint faced by the Army Reserve. In some respects, resourcing difficulties are derived from other factors described in this paper, such as the CSS intensive nature of the Army Reserve and the Reserve's dependence on unsympathetic external support systems.

The analysis that follows looks at resourcing patterns during the FY81-87 period, the Reagan years, and shows striking dissimilarities between the Army Reserve and its sister organization, the Army National Guard. In a sense, these resourcing difficulties are a tangible and graphic case study of the problems the external environment poses for the Army Reserve.

CASE STUDY: Resourcing the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard During the Reagan Years: Striking Dissimilarities

After President Reagan took office in January 1981, the defense budget grew substantially, increasing from $131.9 billion in FY81 to $280.1 billion in FY85, where it essentially remained, in current dollars, through FY87.

During this expansionary period, the Reserve Components of the U.S. military forces experienced sizeable growth, and the largest of the Reserve Components, those of the U.S. Army, grew the most and took on a significantly larger portion of the Army's capabilities. In fact, by FY88 the Army's Reserve Components made up 50 percent of the Army's personnel strength, up from 42 percent in FY81, accounted for 53 percent of the Army's force structure and provided 67 percent of the Army's combat service support capability.[12]

Both of the Army's Reserve Components, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard, experienced significant growth during this period. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) units, which are oriented toward combat support and combat service support missions such as medicine, communications, transportation, and engineering grew by 67,963 people (+30.9 percent) and by 37,100 force structure spaces (+14.4 percent). Army National Guard (ARNG) units, which are oriented more toward combat missions such as infantry and tank roles grew by 47,664 people (+12.6 percent) and by 35,800 force structure spaces (+8.4 percent).[13]

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However, in the resourcing arena, the Army National Guard grew geometrically and far outdistanced the Army Reserve. ARNG Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations grew by three times as many dollars as USAR O&M; and by FY87 ARNG O&M was a billion dollars (or 127 percent) greater than Reserve O&M.[14] At the same time, full-time Guardsmen grew by twice the number as full-time Reservists, which made the Guard's total full-time force (guardsmen and civilians) more than double that of the Army Reserve.[15] Lastly, the equipment delivered to Army Guard units increased so substantially that by FY86 the Army National Guard was receiving about ten times as much equipment per year as the Army Reserve.[16]

This case study will examine in some detail the striking dissimilarities in resource levels between the Army Guard and the Army Reserve in O&M appropriations, full-time personnel, and equipment. The graphs and tables at Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 illustrate the situation dramatically. Figure 3 shows the O&M history of the Reserve Components during the Reagan administration. Figure 4 depicts the full-time forces of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve during this period. Figure 5 shows the AGR forces; and Figure 5 graphs the dollar value of annual equipment deliveries.

Substantial Likenesses Between the Two Organizations

Before examining more closely the differences in resources, one should review the substantial likenesses between the two organizations--likenesses that are so great that the Army

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Guard and the Army Reserve are often confused with each other, even by members of the Active Army.

In addition to the obvious cosmetic similarities of wearing Army uniforms, adhering to the Army rank structure, and using Army equipment and weapons, the Army Guard and the Army Reserve have many other features in common: For example, their personnel are principally part-time soldiers who meet one weekend a month and two weeks or more in the summer, receive their basic training and advanced individual training at Active Army schools, and include a majority of personnel who have served on active duty with the Active Army. In addition, Reserve personnel and most Guard personnel are paid by federal monies, at uniform rates of pay, and are subject to the same retirement scales. Moreover, both the ARNG and the USAR are programmed and budgeted through the Department of Defenses's PPBS system and the Army's PPBES system. Also, the Guard and the Reserve have the same three appropriations: military personnel (known as NGPA and RPA, respectively); operations and maintenance (known as OMNG and OMAR, respectively); and military construction (known as MCNG and MCAR, respectively). Lastly, both Reserve Components rely on Active Army appropriations for research and development (R&D) and for most equipment and weapons procurement.

Striking Dissimilarities in O&M Appropriations

Given the many likenesses in the Army's two Reserve Components, the enormous resource gaps between them are all

the more striking. Looking first at O&M appropriations depicted at Figure 3, the gap was between $400 million and $500 million from FY81 through FY84. Then in FY85, the difference shot up to $706.6 million, making Guard O&M expenditures 96 percent greater than Reserve O&M. In FY86, the gap grew to $825.4 million, a 111 percent difference. And in FY87 it became $973.0 million, an enormous 127 percent gap.[17]

By FY87, based on the President's Budget submission, the major components of the gap were repair parts ($218.5 million difference), POL ($51.2 million difference), so-called "organizational clothing and equipment" ($138.5 million difference), and technicians' pay ($469.4 million difference).[18] These differences were driven by the Guard's larger equipment inventory, larger civilian work force, and higher budgeted "Optempo" (operating tempo) rate, i.e., equipment usage factor. The Guard's optempo rate was budgeted at 35 percent of the Active Army rate while, by contrast, the Reserve's optempo rate was budgeted at only 25 percent of the Active rate.[19]

	81	82	83	84	85	86	87
OMNG	951.4	1,109.7	1,195.1	1,118.4	1,439.3	1,566.3	1,7-2.2
OMAR	521.6	666.7	705.6	692,4	732.7	740.9	709.2
△	429.8	443.0	489.5	426.0	706.6	825.4	973.0
△ / OMAR	82.4%	66.4%	69.4%	61.5%	96.4%	111.3%	126.5%

NOTE: Appropriation amounts shown in table are in millions of dollars.

FIGURE 3

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Substantial Differences in Full-Time Strengths

The second resourcing disparity in the 1980's has been the disproportionately larger growth in Army National Guard full-time personnel strength, shown in Figure 4. Between FY81 and the end of FY87, the Guard full-time force (i.e., civilians plus AGR) grew 63 percent and went from 8.6 percent of unit strength to 12.5 percent. By contrast, over the same six years the Army Reserve full-time force grew 38 percent and did not change appreciably as a percentage of Reserve unit strength, going from 8.0 percent in FY81 to just 8.5 percent in FY87.[20]

The growth in the Guard's full-time strength was produced principally by an 15,185 increase in Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel. AGR strength ramps are shown at Figure 5. Combined with a 5,519 increase in its large full-time civilian work force, the Guard's total full-time personnel strength amounted to 53,402 in FY87.[21]

During the same period, the Army Reserve AGR force grew 7,322 while its full-time civilian force declined by 695. As a consequence, as of FY87, the Army Reserve employed a total full-time force of 24,355, almost 30,000 less than the Army Guard.[22]

FULL-TIME PERSONNEL

Personnel (000's) vs Fiscal Years (81–87), showing National Guard and Army Reserve lines.

Army National Guard

	81	82	83	84	85	86	87
Civilians	22.6	23.0	23.2	25.0	25.9	27.8	28.2
AGR	10.1	11.4	13.8	1o.7	21.1	23.8	25.2
Full Time Total	32.7	34.3	36.9	41.7	47.0	51.5	53.4
PDS (unit strength)	379.0	396.2	403.4	417.6	418.9	422.4	426.6
Full Time/PDS	8.6%	8.7%	9.2%	10.0%	11.2%	12.2%	12.5%

Army Reserve

	81	82	83	84	85	86	87
Civilians	12.6	12.6	12.3	12.6	14.3	13.1	11.9
AGR	5.1	5.9	7.0	8.8	10.8	12.2	12.4
Full Time Total	17.7	18.5	19.3	21.4	25.1	25.3	24.4
PDS (unit strength)	220.1	242.9	251.0	255.4	269.4	284.5	288.1
Full-Time/PDS	8.0%	7.6%	7.7%	8.4%	9.3%	8.9%	8.5%

FIGURE 4

22

(i.e., Full-Time Guardsmen & Reservists)

Fiscal Years

Army National Guard

	81	82	83	84	85	86	87
AGR	10.1	11.4	13.8	16.7	21.1	23.8	25.2
PDS (unit strength)	379.0	396.2	403.4	417.6	418.9	422.4	426.6
AGR/PDS	2.7%	2.9%	3.4%	4.0%	5.0%	5.6%	5.9%

Army Reserve

	81	82	83	84	85	86	87
AGR	5.1	5.9	7.0	8.8	10.8	12.2	12.4
PDS (unit strength)	220.1	242.9	251.0	255.4	269.4	284.5	288.1
AGR/PDS	2.3%	2.4%	2.8%	3.5%	3.8%	4.3%	4.3%

NOTE: All personnel figures above are in thousands and represent official
strengths at the end of the respective fiscal years.

FIGURE 5

ACTIVE GUARD/RESERVE (AGR) STRENGTH

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Enormous Differences in Equipment Deliveries

The third and last resource area exhibiting a striking disparity is that of equipment deliveries. This category reflects far and away the largest gap between the Guard and the Reserve. As shown by the chart at Figure 6, the difference in annual equipment deliveries jumped from $286 million in FY83 to $663 million in FY84, then to $1,282 million in FY85, and finally to $1,560 million in FY86, at which point the Guard was receiving almost ten times more equipment per annum than the Reserve.[23]

Of the $1,737 billion in equipment received by the Guard units in FY86, as much as $1.115 billion consisted of the sorts of combat weapons and equipment not widely required by USAR units, e.g., tanks, guided missiles, and combat vehicles. However, the remainder consisted of items common to the Reserve and Guard. This common core included, for example, trucks, of which the Guard received 10,814 valued at $271 million while, by contrast, the Reserve received 2,132 worth $51 million. Common items also consisted of communications gear, of which the Guard received $102 million and the Reserve, $6 million.[24]

The impact of the disproportionate equipment deliveries can be seen in the difference in Equipment-On-Hand (EOH) readiness of Guard and Reserve units. Because of the substantially greater amount of equipment received by the Army National Guard, its units have been rated appreciably more ready this decade than Reserve units, especially the last several years. In fact, even Reserve units scheduled to deploy before Guard

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(or Active Army) units have been universally less ready in terms of equipment-on-hand. In effect, the DOD/Army doctrine that calls for units to be equipped in the order of their planned deployment has been abrogated as far as it pertains to the Army Reserve.

DOLLAR VALUE OF EQUIPMENT RECEIVE

FY81 - FY86

FIGURE 6

EQUIPMENT RECEIVED BY ARNG & USAR (FY81-86)

26

ENDNOTES

1. Ronald Reagan, <u>National Security Strategy of the</u> <u>United States</u>, p. 18.

2. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 28.

3. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 22.

4. <u>Ibid.</u>

5. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 39.

6. Reserve Component Training Strategy Task Force, <u>IPR-5</u>.

7. Lund, p. 4. Woody, p. 1.

8. John M. Vann, "The Forgotten Forces," p. 10.

9. Reagan, p. 20.

10. Army Training Board, <u>Enhancing Reserve Component</u> <u>Unit Training</u>, p. 31.

11. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 40.

12. Lund, p. 4.

13. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 1 & 4.

14. Based on final official FY87 data provided tele-phonically by LTC Kenneth Galbreath, OCSA.

15. Lund, pp. 2 & 3.

16. Army Depot Systems Command, <u>FY 86 Reports of</u> <u>Equipment Distribution</u>.

17. Based on data collected by author from respective appropriation directors, and supplemented by telephone conversation referenced in Note 14 above. Also, as shown in Figures 7 and 8 in Appendix 2, as of the end of FY87 the ARNG was 48 percent larger than the USAR in unit personnel strength and 57 percent larger in terms of force structure.

18. David S. Ritterpusch, "Analysis of Difference Between OMNG and OMAR (FY87)," pp. 1 & 3 & Encl. 1.

19. Ritterpusch, "Preliminary Findings - COA Costing of RC Equipment," pp. 1 & Encl. 1.

20. Lund, pp. 1-3.

21. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

22. Ibid.

23. Ritterpusch, Equipment on Hand and Readiness of Army Units, TAB I.

24. Army Depot Systems Command, FY86 Reports of Equipment Distribution. Also, S.R. Woods, Jr., RCCC Briefing, Unnumbered slides.

25. There are some indications the long-promised flow of equipment to Army Reserve units may have finally begun. Preliminary figures indicate Army Reserve units received over $400 million worth of equipment in FY87, which would be an enormous improvement over previous years. If this new trend continues, as many feel it will, then some of the anxieties over equipping problems can be reduced. However, continued vigilance on the Reserve's behalf would seem prudent given the track record of recent years and given the vulnerability of Reserve/CSS equipment procurement and delivery plans.

CHAPTER III

INTERNAL REVIEW

Having looked at the external environment in which the
Army Reserve operates, the study now turns to the internal
make-up of the Army Reserve. It reviews three areas of internal
strength that bode well for the Reserve's ability to contribute
to the defense strategy, and it examines three significant
internal barriers to such mission performance.

MAJOR STRENGTHS

Three areas of internal strength that would seem to
indicate the Army Reserve's capacity for contributing to the
national defense strategy will be presented in the section
that follows. These potentially powerful assets are, first,
the significant growth in both the number and quality of Army
Reserve unit personnel; second, the development of a professional,
increasingly capable full-time military infrastructure; and
last, the embryonic trend toward systems and facilities tailored
to real world Reserve requirements.

Substantial Growth in Numbers and Quality of Unit Personnel

First, as indicated in earlier portions of this paper,
Army Reserve unit strength has grown substantially this decade.
To recapitulate, Reserve units have grown 31 percent (68,000)

since FY81 and 56 percent (100,000) since FY78, the post-Vietnam lowpoint for military strength.

In addition, the quality of soldiers enlisting in the Army Reserve has improved dramatically this decade. To illustrate, in FY80 only 51 percent of new Army Reserve enlistees having no prior military service were high school diploma graduates. By contrast, in FY87 **95 percent** of such new Army Reserve accessions were high school diploma graduates. Similarly, in FY83 (the first year such USAR data was kept) only 40 percent of new Army reserve enlistees were in the top half of the population in terms of mental aptitude. By FY87, the Army Reserve's figure had soared to **71 percent**. These high quality levels for high school completion and mental category place the Army Reserve well above the Army National Guard, for which 85 percent of FY87 enlistees were high school graduates and 49 percent were in the upper half mentally. They also position the Army Reserve somewhat above the Active Army, whose FY87 accessions were 91 percent high school graduates and 67 percent upper mental categories.[1]

Emergence of Full-Time Military Infrastructure

A second strength of the Army Reserve is the emergence of a professional full-time military infrastructure dedicated to the Reserve. This force, known as the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR), has grown from 5,092 in FY81 to 12,414 in FY87, which, while still only 4.3 percent of Reserve unit strength (see Figure 5), is large enough to have an impact in several areas.[2]

In particular, the AGR's provide three functions that make the Reserve more capable of supporting the national defense strategy. First, they are a full-time bridge between the part-time, local Reserve units and the permanent, highly centralized Active Army structure (on which the Army Reserve is so dependent). Second, they supply the Reserve manpower for combined Active Army-Reserve full-time operations, such as the Army Recruiting Command. And lastly, they are the full-time military work force for Reserve organizations at each level: unit, field agency, and department.

In regard to the first function, that of spanning the gap between the Active Army and the Reserve units, the AGR contribution takes at least three forms: First, it facilitates better overall Army and OSD decision making by introducing Reserve considerations into the planning, policy making, and resourcing processes that take place day-in, day-out in the Pentagon and at other headquarters. Second, it represents Reserve interests by providing ombudsmen for Reserve needs and Reserve programs. Third, it produces a networking effect between Active Army and Reserve personnel that leads to a regular exchange of information between key players at the operational level.

The second role served by the AGR is as the Reserve element in combined Active Army-Reserve operations. The Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) is the most prominent example of this sort of arrangement. The 2,000 Army Reserve AGR's assigned to USAREC work as production recruiters or as members of the

various USAREC management and support systems at the local, regional, and national levels.[3]

The Recruiting Command is a unique example of an operation that had been Active Army exclusively and then was converted to a combined Reserve-Active Army endeavor. Its results have been spectacular, notwithstanding the fact that at the outset there had been considerable reservation about the likelihood of success, especially within the Reserve community. Almost immediately after USAREC was assigned the Army Reserve mission, Army Reserve enlistments doubled--due in part to a large build-up of AGR personnel. Then, the quality of Army Reserve enlistments began to improve dramatically, reaching parity with Active Army accessions in the mid-1980's and exceeding the Active Army in FY87. The bulk of Army Reserve enlistments throughout the period were made by the Army Reserve AGR's assigned to USAREC.

The third distinct function of the AGR is to serve as the full-time military element for part-time and full-time Reserve organizations. For instance, at the unit level such duty includes full-time maintenance personnel supporting Reserve aviation units. At the field agency level, an example would be the AGR personnel at ARPERCEN (the Army Reserve Personnel Center) responsible for much of the personnel administration for the Army Reserve to include its 300,000 Individual Ready Reservists. At the departmental level, this function includes those AGR personnel assigned to the Office, Chief Army Reserve,

who currently include non-commissioned personnel, action officers, division chiefs, and the executive officer.

Embryonic Trend Toward Systems Tailored to Reserve's Real World

The third favorable internal development concerns the early signs of progress toward having systems tailored to real world Reserve requirements. Foremost among these pioneer efforts are the Regional Training Sites (RTS), formerly known as RMTS (Regional Maintenance Training Sites) and RMTC (Regional Medical Training Centers). These innovations represent a serious and cost-effective way to compensate for such Reserve (and ARNG) training constraints as unit dispersion, limited training time, and limited state-of-the-art equipment.

Four of the maintenance versions of Regional Training Sites were put in operation in FY86 and FY87, and seventeen more are programmed through FY92. The regional maintenance training facilities allow RC units to sharpen their skills on the latest Army equipment, the same type of equipment they would maintain on the battlefield.[4]

Seven medical versions of Regional Training Sites are programmed for construction from FY88-FY92, with the first such medical site to be in operation in FY89. Again, the concept is to enable units from throughout a region to train on the latest equipment by providing a common set of equipment that will be shared by each unit during its respective training period.[5]

The fears with the Regional Training Sites, as with so many Reserve programs, concern how to protect them and their dollar and personnel resources, especially since they are new programs. Despite the fact they are cost-effective, high return investments, Regional Training Sites may be vulnerable, especially in a severely constrained fiscal environment. After all, they lack the quick recognition and emotional support that combat arms items such as combat vehicles and major weapons systems engender, rational operational considerations notwithstanding.

INHIBITORS

In the external environmental review in Chapter II, the external management and support systems' shortcomings, the effects of a disproportionately large CSS mission, and fundamental resourcing difficulties were cited as significant obstacles hindering the Army Reserve from playing the role intended for it in the national strategy. The section that follows will examine three large internal problem areas that further restrict the Army Reserve. These internal inhibitors are as follows: the dysfunctional management structure superimposed on the Army Reserve, the many challenges inherent in the weekend Reserve training environment, and persistently high enlisted attrition.

Dysfunctional Management Structure

First, the management structure superimposed on Army Reserve units is largely dysfunctional. To begin, under the current arrangement Army Reserve units do not belong to the Chief, Army Reserve. Rather, most of them are the responsibility of FORSCOM (U.S. Forces Command), an active component operation headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, and run by active component Generals and active component Colonels, of whom none have been Army Reserve unit members and very few have had previous Reserve management experience.

By contrast, the units of both the Air Force Reserve and the Naval Reserve belong to the Chief, Air Force Reserve and Chief, Naval Reserve, respectively.[6] These two chiefs are both Reserve officers and their staffs are composed of Reserve dedicated personnel. In addition, all units of the Air National Guard and Army National Guard belong to their respective State's National Guard organizations, which are commanded by full-time National Guard officers and managed and supported by National Guard staffs.

Looked at from the top down, the Army's dysfunctional arrangement for its Reserve creates the extremely serious management problem of not knowing whom to hold responsible for Reserve matters. Typically, the senior most Army leaders and the Director of the Army Staff's action officers have tended to pass actions that concern the Army Reserve to OCAR, even when OCAR had absolutely no functional control over the problems

and even though OCAR was in no position to drive either the functionally relevant Army Staff elements or FORSCOM to arrive at meaningful solutions.

Associated with this dilemma has been the tendency of the Department of Army Staff itself to defer to FORSCOM on Reserve matters, almost as though FORSCOM were the equivalent of the Department of Army for the Army Reserve. In such cases, this has meant no one in DCSOPS, DCSLOG, DCSPER, or in the Chief or Vice Chief of Staff's offices was "driving the train;" no one was holding FORSCOM accountable; no one at the highest levels was representing Army Reserve interests.

The result of this seemingly innocent abrogation of responsibility has been that problems have often received only superficial treatment at the departmental level, that sufficient resources have often not been *programmed and rarely well* defended, and that, in general, there has been a lack of positive sustained inertia in regard to Army Reserve matters. (The Army Reserve's resourcing shortcomings cited at some length in Chapter II are derived in part from this dysfunctional arrangement.)

Challenges Inherent in the Weekend Reserve Training Environment

A second internal inhibitor is the Reserve weekend training environment, which is markedly different from the Active Army training environment and poses a number of unique challenges that include the following: discontinuous training time, long distances to common training support locations, severe personnel

turbulence, seriously limited available training time, wide geographic dispersion of units, structural turbulence, and convoluted chains of command.[7]

These fundamental challenges are compounded for the Army Reserve by its numerous CSS missions, many of which do not lend themselves readily to the creation of stimulating, productive training experiences, especially in the confines of the weekend, Reserve Center environment.

A further complication comes from the critical lack of Reserve training devices and simulators. In May 1987 the Army Training Board reported that,

> Any examination of the RC training environment must inevitably lead to the conclusion that device based training is essential for RC units. In spite of the absolute necessity for such support to enhance training . . . the Army still does not have a focused effort to generate the support required . . . The Board went on to deplore what it termed "the paucity of training devices found in RC units . . ."[8]

Persistently High Enlisted Attrition

The third internal inhibitor with which the Army Reserve is burdened is persistently high enlisted attrition. Specifically, the Army Reserve loses roughly one-third of the collective enlisted strength of its units each year. This contrasts sharply with the Active Army and the Army National Guard, which lose about one-fifth of their respective enlisted forces each year.

There are both readiness and dollar costs associated with the Army Reserve's high enlisted attrition. On the one hand, the high turnover wastes trained manpower and produces vacancies

in specialties for which it takes many months, even years, to acquire and train replacements. Thus, units are less ready in terms of appropriate skilled manpower than they should be. Beyond this, the dollar costs involved in replacing seventy or eighty thousand enlisted losses a year are quite high. To the extent the replacements must be sent to basic and advanced individual training, a full salary for six months to a year, depending on the specialty, must be paid per replacement. This is a considerably more expensive proposition than simply paying reservists for one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer.

The attrition problem is tied in some measure to the challenges posed by the Reserve weekend training environment and compounded by related factors such as the Reserve's CSS intensive nature, a failure of the Army historically to address the unique problems in the Reserve weekend training environment, and the absence of simulators and training devices oriented to the Reserve environment.[9] Accordingly, the DCSOPS and TRADOC Reserve training initiatives mentioned earlier warrant substantial encouragement. Anything that can be done to help unit leadership make the Reserve weekend more productive and more stimulating should be tried.

In addition, there are numerous questions about intangibles which could be raised. For instance, what is the effect of not having the clear identity that National Guard and Active Army units have? How much does not having a structure and

leadership of its own contribute to the Army Reserve's attrition problem? How big a part does the step-child relationship with the Active Army play? How much has the dysfunctional management arrangement perpetuated this situation?

These are difficult questions and, in some cases, no clear answers are forthcoming. However, the Defense Department's current and projected fiscal constraints, enlisted attrition's substantial cost in both readiness and funds, and the desirability of retaining the high quality personnel in the Army Reserve all argue for finding real solutions that reduce attrition by attacking the underlying causes.

ENDNOTES

1. Official data provided by ODCSPER, HQ, DA.

2. Lund, p. 1.

3. Ibid., p. 3.

4. William F. Ward, Posture of the US Army Reserve, FY89, p. 46.

5. Reserve Forces Policy Board, Annual Report, FY86, p. 83.

6. "Reserve Forces Review - II," The Officer, February 1988, pp. 50-69.

7. Logistics Management Institute: Needed: A Strategy for the Technical Training of Reservists, pp. 3-1 to 3-7 & 4-2. Also, Army Training Board, pp. 3-4 & 3-19.

8. Army Training Board, pp. 39-40.

9. Custom Research, Inc., USAR Retention Focus Groups, pp. 1-23. Also, Custom Research, Inc., USAR Retention Focus Groups Additional Report, pp. 1-14. Also, ODCSPER, USAR Retention and Loss Management Findings. Also ODCSOPS, "Trip Reports to 1st, 2d, 4th, 5th and 6th CONUSA's, 13 Jan - 27 Jan 87." (See Appendix 1 for verbatim extracts from Custom Research's reports.)

CHAPTER IV

CHECKLISTS OF KEY OPERATIONAL QUESTIONS

If the Army Reserve is to perform the functions expected of it in the national defense strategy, its strengths, such as those given in the first halves of Chapters II and III, need to be protected and built upon; and obstacles to the performance of its mission, such as given in the second halves of Chapters II and III, need to be overcome. Accordingly, the four check lists that follow give some of the principal operational questions that need to be addressed if the national strategy is to be served. They are organized into the following four operational areas of concern: Resourcing, Training, Equipping, and Leading and Managing.

Resourcing

Looking at the relative weakness of Army Reserve resourcing this decade, the following operational challenges are raised for the Army:

- How to protect the limited Army Reserve resources from arbitrary across-the-board decrement drills? For example, how to guard the Army Reserve against pro-rata shares of decrements? Such blind cuts, while convenient to senior budget managers, tend to

be inequitable and to perpetuate or compound past shortfalls.

- How to safeguard funds for critical future Reserve programs, especially programs unique to the Reserve Components, e.g., Regional Training Sites. Similarly, how to safeguard funds for programs whose immediate criticality seems greater to the Army Reserve than to the Active Army, e.g., readiness improvements programmed for the Army's CSS units?

- How to bring about greater Army Reserve representation throughout the resourcing process?

- How to tailor resourcing systems so they are as responsive to Army Reserve needs as to Active Army and Army National Guard requirements? Are new resourcing arrangements needed for Army Reserve units?

Training

Looking at the pronounced, fundamental differences between the Reserve training environment and the Active Army environment, the following operational challenges face the Army:

- How to produce training that is effective in the Reserve environment, especially for drill weekends in Reserve Centers/Guard Armories?

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- How to produce training that is effective for Combat Service Support units?

- How to develop and field simulators and training devices for Reserve training, especially for CSS units? It is important to recognize that with the current system, the major drivers for new simulators/training devices are the Active Army "proponents," e.g., the Armor Branch, the Infantry Branch, etc.: Does **special proponency** authority need to be granted to the Reserve Components to assure that new Total Army devices have Reserve utility and to provide a way for Reserve-unique training devices to be initiated?[1]

- How to make Reserve Component unit training productive and stimulating?

- How to safeguard planned Reserve Component training innovations, such as Regional Training Sites? How to protect the funds programmed for them? How to make certain they are resourced with sufficient numbers of qualified personnel?

Equipping

Looking at the disparities in equipment deliveries and the resulting low equipment-on-hand readiness of Army Reserve units, even of early deploying Army Reserve units, the following operations challenges confront the Army:

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-       How to tailor Army systems to enable the Army to
        really "equip first those units that are to deployed
        first"--to include Army Reserve units? In other
        words, how to make Army systems live up to Army and
        DOD warfighting doctrine?

-       How to safeguard current plans that call for significant
        improvements in the equipment-on-hand readiness of
        CSS units? This question reflects concern over the
        typical funding erosion between programmed monies
        and budgeted monies as well as the lack of high
        level sponsors for CSS requirements.[2]

-       How to spare OPA ("Other Procurement Appropriation")
        funds from disproportionately large decrements?
        Concern here is for those OPA funds which provide
        the relatively less exotic equipment needed by
        Reserve units, especially Reserve CS/CSS units.[3]

-       How to solve the "non-procurable item" problem that
        contributes to the USAR readiness problems?[4]

Leading and Managing

Looking at the step-child relationship of the Army Reserve
to the Active Army and the implications this has had for
leading and managing the Army Reserve, the following operational
challenges confront the Army:

-       How to provide essential support and services to
        the Army Reserve and to Army Reserve units? This refers

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not only to field support but to support at the HQ, Department of Army level as well.

- How to enable the Army Reserve to be more self-sufficient in areas where the Active Army is not able to provide the necessary support?

- How to reinforce factors that lead to a positive sense of purpose, identity, morale, self-esteem, and professionalism in Army Reserve units?

- How to make Command and Control channels responsive to Army Reserve units?

- How to build Reserve-specific training into the professional development of the officer corps, perhaps beginning at ROTC and continuing through War College?

ENDNOTES

1. Army Training Board, pp. 39-43; Logistics Management Institute, pp. 4-10 & 4-11.

2. Ibid., pp. 48-51.

3. C.F. Gill and D.S. Ritterpusch, "Changes in Equipment Procurement Appropriations," p. 1 & Encl. 1-5.

4. Reserve Forces Policy Board, Annual Report FY86, pp. 44-45.

CHAPTER V

OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES VS. STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS

Having examined the Army Reserve's external environment in some detail in Chapter II, having looked at its internal strengths and inhibitors in Chapter III, and having summarized operational questions in Chapter IV, the study now matches Army Reserve capabilities against the national defense strategy.

To perform that match, the study recalls the national strategy's requirements for increased Army Reserve capabilities, requirements that call for the Reserve to provide both a large portion of the Army's total capabilities and, critically, a very large share of the support required at the outset of war. Further, it notes that the Army Reserve force structure was enlarged every year this decade to accommodate that demand and together with the Army National Guard's force structure is now 12 percent larger than the Active Army's. It notes also that the Army Reserve has increased substantially the number and quality of its unit personnel and has made serious headway in building a full-time professional infrastructure.

However, when Army Reserve capabilities are reviewed in the context of strategic go-to-war requirements, significant operational shortfalls are found in four major areas: resourcing, weekend training, equipping, and leading/managing. These deficiencies limit the **Army's** ability to sustain itself in

war, diminish the **Army's** readiness to go to war, and produce inefficient drain on **defense** resources.

To illustrate, the **Army** incurs **sustainment** limitations when the Army Reserve is operationally handicapped simply because so much of the Army's warfighting support capability is in the Army Reserve. For example, when an Army Reserve CSS unit is short in qualified personnel, lacks current training, or needs modern equipment to train on or take into battle, the **Army** becomes deficient in those CSS/sustainment capabilities. The seriousness of this problem is greater now that there is an increased likelihood of having to conduct operations sequentially, referenced in the National Security Strategy.[1] The requirement to fight a continuous series of operations in successive theaters will place a premium on sustainment capabilities.

The **Army readiness** deficiencies caused by the Army Reserve's operational shortcomings are most easily detected in the quantifiable realms of equipment-on-hand (EOH) and MOS (Military Occupational Specialty) qualified personnel. The problems in EOH readiness grow out of breakdowns and inequities in the equipment distribution systems, described in the case study at the end of Chapter II and in Chapter IV. The problems in personnel MOS readiness are cited in the attrition section at the end of Chapter III, as follows:

> The high turnover . . . produces vacancies in specialties
> for which it takes many months, even years, to acquire
> and train replacements. Thus, units are less ready in
> terms of appropriate skilled manpower than they should
> be.

In cases where the specialties concerned are relatively unique

to the Reserve, the **Army** will be suffering a serious deficiency

because of its dependency on the Reserve to supply that skill.

The inefficient drain on **defense resources** is most clearly

evident in the high enlisted attrition caused by all four

operational problem areas. The cost to replace Army Reserve

enlisted losses is almost three-quarters of a billion dollars

per year. Some attrition is natural, even desirable. However,

if the rate of Army Reserve attrition could be reduced to the

Active Army level, then about one-quarter of a billion dollars

would be saved per year.[2]

Despite the seriousness of the operational shortfalls

themselves, closer scrutiny reveals that the overall problem

is broader than the failure to be adequately resourced, the

failure to facilitate effective weekend training, the failure

to be suitably equipped, or the failure to be provided with

satisfactory leadership and management. Rather, the crux of

the problem is systemic. That is, the systems necessary to support

the substantial expansion of the Army Reserve, and its enlarged

and now critical roles in the national defense strategy, have

not kept pace.

The external systems, such as those that are supposedly

Total Army, generally are not tailored to Reserve needs. The

internal systems, such as afforded by the FORSCOM arrangement, are often dysfunctional or immature. The bottom line is that not enough systems are working well in support of the Reserve. Furthermore, unlike the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve is not sufficiently autonomous to be able to set up its own systems. Whether it wants to be or not, the Army Reserve is dependent on the Active Army, the Department of the Army staff, and Active Army and Total Army field agencies.

The Army has made strides to improve Reserve support. However, it is neither resourced nor organized to sustain that effort. As it now stands, despite a seemingly high potential, the Army Reserve is operationally underdeveloped, and the national defense strategy is flawed.

ENDNOTES

1. Reagan, p. 39.

2. It is important to remember that training replacements for Reserve losses requires placing the new recruits lacking military experience on active duty and paying them active duty salaries and benefits for the time required for basic training and advanced individual training, which in some cases can be a year or more. These personnel expenses are extraordinary costs for the Reserve because, unlike the Active Army, Reserve unit personnel are not normally paid full-time wages. In fact, one of the major attractions of Reserve forces is that their personnel costs are so much lower, typically one-sixth of active duty costs per individual.

CHAPTER VI

STRATEGIC OPTIONS

The strategic options available to U.S. national leaders are essentially as follows:

1. To change the national defense strategy.

2. Alternatively, to improve the Army Reserve's operational capabilities so that it can perform at a level required by the national strategy.

Based on the preceding five chapters, adopting the second strategic option, that of making the Reserve more capable, entails making significant improvements in the **operational systems supporting the Army Reserve.**

Such improvements involve more than just a commitment by the Army. They require a decision by OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) to support the Reserve portion of the national defense strategy.

Within the government, OSD is the banker for the Army, and for the other military services as well. It is within OSD's power to shift resources within the Department of Defense. If the military services and their active and reserve components can not operationally support the national defense strategy, then ultimately OSD must be held responsible.

The systemic changes required to make the Army Reserve more capable of supporting the national defense strategy involve a mix of the following four broad operational improvements:

1. Converting Active Army systems to support the Army Reserve.

2. Modifying existing Army systems, i.e., so-called Total Army systems, to better support the Army Reserve.

3. Expanding existing Army Reserve systems.

4. Creating new systems (in any of the three modes above) to support the Army Reserve.

Briefly, examples of the four operational modes cited above are as follows:

1. Conversion of Active Army systems to the Reserve-Active Army mode: The best example is the Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), which in its transformed mode uses Army Reserve AGR's extensively and has produced sensational results for the Army Reserve (see Chapter III).[1]

2. Modification of existing "Total Army" systems: This could mean, for example, having DCSLOG, DCSOPS and DCSPER comprehensively involved in supporting the Army Reserve. Such commitment could mean re-structuring, perhaps a commitment by OSD to provide manpower and the funds for such manpower.

3. Expansion of existing Army Reserve systems. This could mean, for example, substantial expansion of

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the Chief, Army Reserve's function, and Office.[2] Again, a commitment from OSD for manpower and the funds for such manpower would be imperative.

4. If the first three types of operational improvements do not cover all the gaps between the national strategic requirements and Reserve operational capabilities, then it may be necessary to create new systems to support the Army Reserve. Such new systems could take the form of any of the three modes above, depending on how broad the Army's requirements are, for example, if the remaining Army Reserve gap is in an area also required by the Active Army and the Army National Guard, an appropriate Total Army system should be established.

Again, however, it is stressed that OSD has the ultimate responsibility for assuring that the national defense strategy is carried out, and OSD is in charge of the resources available to implement the defense strategy. Accordingly, the underlying imperative is that OSD commit to improving the operational systems supporting the Army Reserve and underwrite the efforts that will be required of the Army.

ENDNOTES

1.   Many of the candidates for such conversion today may try to represent themselves as something more than Active Army operations; however, close examination will often show that for most intents and purposes, they are as yet simply Active Army operations.

2.   For instance, Mr. William D. Clark, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), has expressed the following views: "I'm not sure we really need a major FORSCOM role any longer . . . Now that FORSCOM is a Specified Command with a mission of CONUS (Continental U.S.) defense, their deep involvement in the Reserve Components may not be practical. It might make more sense to further expand the Office, Chief, Army Reserve; give him a third or fourth star as the Component Commander and let him apportion the USAR forces to the CINC's including FORSCOM, as supported deployed commands." 1 December 1987, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. (Quoted with the permission of Mr. Clark.)

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study began by looking at those elements of the national defense strategy that place requirements on the Army Reserve, requirements that have grown in recent years and may continue to grow, especially given reductions that are being made in the Active Army's personnel strength and structure.

The study continued by focusing on six major features of the Army Reserve's external environment. The six chosen included three positive external factors and three negative factors, that we termed obstacles. Next, we examined six major internal elements of the Army Reserve. Again, the six consisted of three strengths and three negative factors, that we called inhibitors. Subsequently, the study identified operational questions growing out of the external and internal reviews. These questions, which represent operational challenges, fell in four major operational areas: resourcing, training, equipping, and leading/managing. After that, we compared the Army Reserve's operational capabilities with the requirements vested in it by the national defense strategy.

The conclusion drawn from this analysis was that despite the substantial growth in the Army Reserve's personnel strength and force structure in the 1980's and despite a number of encouraging recent developments both in the Army's overarching

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infrastructure and in the Army Reserve itself, the Army Reserve is not adequately supported to perform the roles expected of it in the national defense strategy.

To correct this, we emphasized that systems available to support the Army Reserve need to be redirected, tailored, and/or strengthened. If such changes do not produce sufficient operational improvements, then new systems will need to be devised.

Regardless of the exact mix of operational modes adopted, it is crucial that OSD underwrite the operational improvements. OSD controls the resource flow and is ultimately responsible for incapacities in the military services that prevent accomplishment of the national defense strategy.

Because the policy decisions concerned will need to be made at the top of the Defense Department to be effective, it is recommended that the Secretary of Defense (or the Deputy Secretary), the Secretary of the Army, the Army Chief of Staff, and the Chief, Army Reserve determine the Defense Department's vision for the Army Reserve--in the context of the National Security Strategy. After having decided such, it is further recommended that they agree upon a broad plan of action to include broad guidelines for timetables and resource commitments.

As a final recommendation, once supporting operational plans and programs have been set in motion, more precise guidance should be published and the revised operational objectives and arrangements should be institutionalized--to protect the

Department of Defense from sliding back into the situation it
faces today: namely, failure to support the national defense
strategy.

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APPENDIX 1

VERBATIM EXTRACTS FROM USAR RETENTION FOCUS GROUPS[1]

The Underlying Challenge: Boring, Unproductive Weekends.

The following excerpts are from the research findings of

private researchers contracted by the Army and are based on

interviews with members and former members of Army Reserve

units. The findings confirm the widely held but often resisted

observation that Army Reserve unit training, especially on

weekends, tends to be boring and unproductive and represents a

fundamental challenge to the Army:

The reality of the Reserve is boredom.

> Both those still in the Reserve and those who have
> dropped out agree that Reserve weekends are uneventful
> and boring. As one man sums up, "I didn't quite
> expect the severity of the boredom." There is
> agreement that at most weekends, "you sit around and
> do nothing." One man says, "the only real training
> is during the two summer weeks or before inspection,"
> and others agree. Some call weekend activities,
> "make believe," or "not real." One man, now lost to
> the Reserve, says, "I got sick of it because there
> was not much going on. No challenge to it. No work
> getting done. A lot of sitting around." This
> perception is consistent among those who remain in
> the Reserve and those who leave.

Most men perceive typical Reserve weekends to be tedious
and unproductive.

> Asked to describe a typical Reserve weekend, men say
> they have opening formation, receive some assignment,
> do some work, go to classes, "sit around a lot," and
> eventually have final formation. Many men say that
> they are asked to attend "the same classes over and
> over again." Others say they watch people do work
> because there isn't enough to go around. Some
> describe seemingly meaningless tasks such as moving
> equipment from one place to another and then moving
> it back. Many say they smoke a lot of cigarettes
> and sometimes watch television.

Few men perceive their "Army job" to be like their civilian job.

> The Reserve is seen as lacking in equipment needed to acquire or maintain skills. Weekends are seen as more boring and less purposeful than civilian work.

The lack of weekend activity in the Reserve is a key dissatisfier.

> Though men complain about officers, slow pay, and lack of promised training, the main complaint is about lack of activity on weekends. They expect to be busy and instead they are bored.

Boredom during weekend drill.

> There is a consensus among all groups that weekend drill is tedious. It lacks hand-on training. Classes are repetitious. Those that remain are almost equally as bothered, but are held by a sense of commitment or friendship or economic "strings."

Stepping up activity and hands-on training could improve satisfaction and retention in the Reserve.

> The strongest piece of advice given is to make the Reserve more active. They want hands-on training. They see the Reserve as, "like reading a play rather than acting a play." They want to be challenged to stay up on skills they known and learn new skills. They want to feel the sense of accomplishment they felt during basic or AIT. They want their weekends busy, not boring.

The key suggestions for improving the Reserve all involve increasing weekend activity.

> - "We need hands-on training," says one man, expressing the feeling of many.
>
> - "I want to actually get out and work with the equipment," says another man.
>
> - A third man says, "I wish they'd organize it a little better and make it more interesting somehow."
>
> - One Reservist says he wishes it was more like AIT (Advanced Individual Training) or basic training, "where you constantly had something to do. You felt important because you completed something minute after minute. You were doing something."

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ENDNOTES

1. All material in this Appendix, except the lead-in paragraph, is comprised entirely of verbatim extracts from Custom Research Inc.'s USAR Retention Focus Groups, pp. 1-23 and USAR Retention Focus Groups, Additional Report, pp. 1-14.

PAID DRILL STRENGTH - ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS

Question: How much larger is the Guard than the Reserve in unit personnel strength?

National Guard

Answer: Guard is 48% larger (Guard has 138,500 more soldiers in units - not to include AGR's.)

Army Reserve

PERSONNEL (000's)

450
425
400
375
350
325
300
275
250
225
200

81   82   83   84   85   86   87

FISCAL YEARS

Paid Drill Strength

	81	82	83	84	85	86	87
ARNG	379.0	396.2	403.4	417.6	418.9	422.4	426.6
USAR	220.1	242.9	251.0	255.4	269.4	284.5	288.1
Δ	158.9	153.3	152.4	162.2	149.5	137.9	138.5
Δ/USAR	72.2%	63.1%	60.7%	63.5%	55.5%	48.5%	48.1%

FIGURE 7

PAID DRILL STRENGTH - ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS

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FORCE STRUCTURE - ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS

Force Structure Spaces

	81	82	83	84	85	86	87
ARNG	425.8	425.6	431.8	435.2	440.7	447.3	452.0
USAR	257.8	263.8	269.4	276.9	279.7	284.6	294.9
Δ	168.0	161.8	162.4	158.3	161.0	162.7	167.1
Δ/USAR	65.2%	61.3%	60.3%	57.2%	57.6%	57.2%	56.7%

FIGURE 8

FORCE STRUCTURE - ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS

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